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Essays on Imperfect Competition
in the Labor Market
Sydnee Caldwell
This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine
the impact of imperfect competition in the labor market on
wage growth and wage inequality. Chapter 1, coauthored
with Nikolaj Harmon, investigates the link between an individual’s wages and her outside labor market opportunities.
To overcome the fact that many factors that shift an individual’s outside opportunities also impact her productivity at her
current job, we develop a novel identification strategy that
generates within-individual (and within-firm-by-occupation)
variation in workers’ information about their outside options.
This strategy, which we implement using monthly employeremployee data from Denmark, exploits the fact that individuals often learn about job opportunities through their
social networks. Using this strategy we find that changes in
workers’ outside labor market opportunities are reflected in
both mobility and wage growth, even for individuals who do
not switch firms.
The reduced-form results in Chapter 1 are inconsistent
with perfect competition and provide empirical support for
a large class of on-the-job search models where workers
are able to leverage outside offers into wage increases at
the incumbent firm (Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin 2006;
Postel-Vinay and Robin 2002). The results in this chapter
therefore suggest that policies that improve workers’ ability
to receive or accept job offers while employed can raise
wages. These policies could include restrictions on firms’
use of noncompete or nonsolicitation agreements or harsh
punishments for firms’ use of no-poach clauses. The results
further suggest that industrial policies that promote “good
jobs” may, through improving workers’ outside options,
benefit a broad set of workers—not simply the workers who
get those jobs (Acemoglu 2001).
Chapter 2, coauthored with Oren Danieli, investigates the
role that cross-sectional differences in individuals’ outside
options play in generating between-group wage inequality.
We use a two-sided matching model to micro-found a measure of workers’ outside options, which we call the outside
options index. We then use German administrative data to
estimate this index and use two sources of variation: 1) the
introduction of high-speed trains and 2) a standard shiftshare instrument to identify the elasticity between our index
and wages. When we combine our measure of options with
this elasticity, we find that roughly one-third of the gender
wage gap in Germany can be explained by differences in
options, mostly the result of differences in effective labor
market size.
Chapter 3, coauthored with Emily Oehlsen, investigates
whether, in the absence of commuting costs, monopsonistic
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firms have an incentive to pay women less. The chapter uses
data from a series of experiments, conducted in collaboration with a national ride-share company, to estimate the
elasticity of men’s and women’s labor supply to both the
market (Frisch elasticities) and the firm. These elasticities
are sufficient to calculate the firm’s optimal gender wage gap
in settings where hours are flexible and settings where they
are not. We find that women are twice as elastic as men are
to the market: in response to a 10 percent increase in wages,
they work 7 percent more compared to 3 percent more. This
does not reverse at the firm level; both men and women
have firm-specific elasticities of between 2 and 4, and there
is no evidence that women are less elastic than men. These
elasticities suggest optimal wage-markdowns of between 20
and 33 percent. The results also indicate that, in the absence
of commuting costs, firms have no incentive to pay equally
productive women less than their male counterparts.
Together, the second and third chapters show that there
are differences in the option sets that men and women face
in the labor market, and that these differences contribute to
the gender wage gap. However, these chapters also suggest
that much of the outside options gap is the result of differences in willingness or ability to commute. To that end,
policies that make it easier for women—particularly those
with children—to commute or to access child care near their
desired place of work may be an effective tool in combating
the gender gap.

Chapter 1
Outside Options, Bargaining, and Wages:
Evidence from Coworker Networks
(with Nikolaj Harmon)
There is growing evidence that imperfect competition
and frictions in the labor market have a significant impact
on the wage distribution (Barth et al. 2016; Card, Heining,
and Kline 2013; Card et al. 2016). In such a labor market,
workers’ wages depend not only on their productivity, but
on the characteristics of the firm for which they work and
on the characteristics of the firms for which they could have
worked.1 A growing number of papers have documented that
equally skilled workers earn different amounts depending on
where they work (see, e.g. Barth et al. 2016; Card, Heining,
and Kline 2013; Song et al. 2015). However, to date, there
is little empirical evidence on the link between workers’
outside options and their wages.2 If two workers at a firm are
equally productive, does the worker with better opportunities
at other firms—or better information about these opportunities—earn more? Can workers renegotiate their wage with
their current firm if they receive an outside offer?
The link between an individual’s outside labor market
opportunities and her wages is important both for distin2019 Dissertation Summaries

guishing between different models of wage-setting and for
understanding how recent developments in the labor market,
including the use of no-poach and nonsolicitation agreements (which reduce workers’ ability to receive offers while
employed), will impact wages. However, examining this link
empirically is challenging both because outside options are
not observed in standard data sets and because most factors
that shift workers’ outside options also shift their productivity in their current job. This is a problem because changes
in productivity at the incumbent firm should impact wages,
even if the labor market is perfectly competitive.
This paper overcomes these challenges by combining a
novel identification strategy that exploits changes in workers’ information about their outside opportunities with rich
administrative data that contain high-frequency (monthly)
wage data and detailed measures of workers’ skills. The
empirical strategy is motivated by a large literature, pioneered by Granovetter, that documents how workers learn
about job opportunities through their social networks
(Granovetter 1973; Ioannides and Datcher Loury 2004; Topa
2011).3 We create measures of a worker’s information about
outside opportunities by weighting firm-specific changes in
labor demand by each worker’s unique coworker network.
These networks consist of the set of individuals a worker has
worked with in the recent past but is no longer working with.
They allow us to identify which new positions an individual
is likely to hear about. Because networks vary across workers within an occupation, and even within a firm-andoccupation group, we are able to exploit differences in information between workers within a narrow skill group.
We implement this approach using a new monthly linked
employer-employee database covering the universe of
employees at Danish firms. While wages in Denmark were
historically set by union bargaining, firms today have considerable latitude to negotiate wages with individual employees (Dahl, Le Marie, and Munch 2013). Our data cover the
period after decentralization.4 The data contain information
on individuals’ monthly earnings and hours worked, and on
their six-digit industry and occupation.
We start by deriving our measure of outside options from
a standard on-the-job search model where firms renegotiate
wages with workers that receive outside offers (Postel-Vinay
and Robin 2002; Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin 2006). The
model allows us to illustrate the two key predictions of this
class of models. First, workers who receive outside offers
from more productive firms leave. Second, workers who
receive outside offers from less-productive firms that dominate their current position renegotiate. We modify the model
to allow workers to learn about job opportunities through
both public sources and their individual-specific social
networks to derive a measure of outside options that we can
take to the data.
We then test the key predictions of this model by regressing indicators for mobility and measures of wage growth
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on our individual- and time-specific measures of outside
options. Our baseline measure weights the number of new
positions at each firm by an individual’s exposure to that firm
through their coworker network. The identifying assumption
is that, conditional on the included covariates, unobserved
determinants of individual mobility or wage growth are
uncorrelated with time-varying labor demand at an individual’s former coworkers’ current firms. In order to focus on
variation in outside options over time for a given worker,
we include worker fixed effects in all of our specifications.
We also control, nonparametrically, for month- and (fourdigit) industry-specific demand shocks. The primary threat to
validity, which we address through a series of distinct tests,
is that the coworker networks proxy for specific types of
skills, and that there are unobserved month-specific changes
in demand for these skills, which are correlated with unobserved determinants of job-to-job mobility and wage growth.
We present nonparametric evidence that confirms both
predictions of the theoretical model: changes in workers’
information about their outside opportunities lead to mobility
and wage growth, and larger changes are necessary to induce
a job-to-job transition than to induce a wage change. Virtually all of the increased mobility is the result of moves to
firms where the worker has a former coworker. This is consistent with the idea that workers learned about the opportunity through their former colleagues. We find that an additional 10 new positions at an individual’s former coworkers’
current firms results in a 15 percent higher probability that
the worker makes a job-to-job transition that month.5 The
same change translates to an approximate $50 increase in
earnings over the course of the year. However, most individuals do not renegotiate: the impact on whether an individual
sees an earnings gain is less than a percentage point. If all
the gains were associated with gains for workers who were
driven to renegotiate (see a positive earnings change), the
average full-time worker would see an 11 percent increase in
base pay.
Both job-stayers and job-movers see higher wages in
response to changes in their outside options; job-stayers
obtain roughly 20 percent the earnings gain of job-movers.
Posting models—such as monopsony models—would predict a ratio of zero: wages do not adjust unless the individual
switches firms. Spot market models where wages freely
fluctuate in response to changes in demand for a worker’s
skill would predict a ratio of one. We are able to reject both
of these extremes.
Several distinct pieces of evidence suggest that our results
are not driven by unobserved changes in demand for workers’ skills. First, we show that the estimates are stable when
adding more detailed nonparametric controls for changes
in demand for different occupation or skill groups. These
controls are based on different combinations of our industry,
occupation, and education fixed effects. Second, we show
that the results are also robust to adopting a within-firm
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identification strategy that exploits variation in coworker networks that emerges from differences in tenure at the current
firm and at past firms. The evidence is most consistent with
worker-initiated renegotiation, not firm-initiated raises. If
the earnings changes were the result of firms learning about
the market price of their workers’ skills, we would expect
all workers within the same firm and occupation to see equal
wage growth.
In order to further show that our results are driven by
changes in workers’ information, and not changes in workers’ productivity, we decompose our measure of outside
options into portions that come from different subsets of an
individual’s former coworkers. We find that the changes in
earnings are driven by changes in labor demand at the firms
of closely connected former coworkers: those who work in
the same administrative region and those whom the individual worked with in the more recent past. Placebo tests
exploiting an individual’s future coworkers—coworkers the
individual has not met yet—tell a similar story. If the results
were driven by unobserved demand shocks, we would expect
measures constructed using these coworkers to have a similar
impact on mobility and wage growth. We would also expect
that adding these measures as controls to our baseline regression would shrink our estimates.6
In the last part of the paper we divide workers into eight
broad occupation groups and reestimate the effects within
each group.7 We find that the impact on workers in the highest skill group (professionals) is double that of workers in the
middle skill group (technicians), and nearly five times that of
workers in the least skilled group. Within each skill group,
women benefit less than men. Because workers in higher
skill groups also have higher baseline earnings—and men
have higher baseline earnings than women—this heterogeneity translates into substantial differences in earnings. The
heterogeneity does not appear to be driven by differences in
the quality of our measure for different groups of workers:
the impacts on mobility do not differ across groups.
To identify whether the heterogeneity across skill groups
is due to differences in wage-setting strategies or differences
in workers’ bargaining power, we then use our reduced-form
estimates to identify a structural search model incorporating
on-the-job search and a mass of posting firms (Flinn and
Mullins 2017). Intuitively, the impact on whether there is a
wage change is informative about the fraction of firms that
post wages; the impact on wages identifies workers’ bargaining power. We estimate this model using a simulated method
of moments. We find that the reduced-form heterogeneity
is largely driven by differences in wage-setting strategies,
not bargaining power: wage renegotiation (posting) is more
common among high- (low-) skilled workers. Using our
estimated parameters, we show that a reduction in the arrival
rate for employed workers would lead to a significant reduction in wage growth. For high-skilled workers, much of this
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is due to decreased on-the-job bargaining; for lower-skilled
workers this is mostly due to decreased mobility.

Chapter 2
Outside Options in the Labor Market
(with Oren Danieli)
In almost every model of the labor market, wages depend
on a worker’s outside options: the amount of compensation
she could receive from different employers. In a perfectly
competitive labor market, an equally attractive outside option
always exists, and competition between identical employers sets compensation at the marginal product. However, in
reality, a worker’s next best option could require a different
combination of her skills, could involve different working
hours, or could be located in a different city. The number
of outside options could be systematically lower for some
workers because of the health of their local labor market,
because they are unwilling or unable to commute, or because
their skills are valuable only for a few employers or industries. Such differences could have significant implications for
their incomes.
A key challenge for empirical research on this topic is
that a worker’s outside option set is not typically observed.
Even within the same firm and occupation, workers may face
different options because of their specific set of skills, their
preferences, or their constraints. As a result, little is known
about which workers have better outside options and what
role options play in generating wage inequality.
The first contribution of this paper is to develop an empirical procedure to uncover a key latent parameter in most
wage-setting models: the value of an individual’s option set.
We show how this latent parameter can be derived from the
cross-sectional concentration of similar workers across jobs.
If similar workers are concentrated in a certain region, industry, occupation, or other job characteristics, then the worker’s
options are more limited. We quantify this concentration
in a single “outside options index” (OOI). We show that in
a matching model of heterogeneous workers and jobs, this
OOI is a sufficient statistic for the effect of outside options
on compensation, when holding productivity constant. We
then estimate the OOI for every worker using administrative
matched employer-employee data from a 1 percent representative sample of workers in Germany. Examining the distribution of the OOI, we find which workers’ characteristics
are associated with better outside options. Next, we quantify
the impact on wages by estimating the elasticity between the
OOI and wages using two quasi-random sources of variation
in the OOI, which holds workers’ productivity constant: the
introduction of high-speed commuter-rails and a shift-share
(“Bartik”) instrument.
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Our second contribution is to show that differences in outside options explain a substantial portion—30 percent—of the
gender wage gap in Germany. This gender difference is driven
entirely by differences in willingness to commute or move.
We start by outlining a static model of the labor market
that illustrates how, with two-sided heterogeneity, differences
in outside options lead to differences in compensation, even
for equally productive workers. Our model is based on the
classic Shapley and Shubik (1971) assignment game—a twosided matching model with transfers. Compensation in this
setting is set to prevent workers from moving to their outside
options; because of heterogeneity, this will be below their
full productivity in the first-best option.
We derive a sufficient statistic from this model, the OOI,
which summarizes the impact of options on compensation.
It measures the quantity of relevant jobs for a given worker.
If a worker gets access to more similar jobs, their compensation would increase by exactly the increase in OOI times
a constant elasticity, even though their productivity remains
constant. The OOI depends on two factors: the supply of jobs
and worker flexibility (i.e., a worker’s ability or willingness to take jobs in more places, more occupations, or more
industries). Workers with more relevant jobs, as captured by
the OOI, will have on average a better outside option, and
will also be able to sort into better matches, conditional on
their productivity.
We show that the OOI is equal to a standard concentration
index: workers with more options are those who, in equilibrium, are found in a greater variety of jobs. Under standard
assumptions on the distribution of match quality (Choo and
Siow 2006; Dupuy and Galichon 2014), the OOI is equal to
the entropy index. This index, with a negative sign, is used in
the industrial organization literature as a measure of market
concentration (Tirole 1988), similar to the HerfindhalHirschman Index (HHI), which has also been used to measure concentration in labor markets (Azar, Marinescu, and
Steinbaum 2017; Benmelech, Bergman, and Kim 2018). In
contrast to most concentration indices, our index is not measured on a specific dimension, such as occupation or industry. Instead, workers’ and firms’ characteristics are allowed to
vary continuously; this allows for the fact that some workers
may have employment opportunities in different occupations
or industries or in different geographic areas. Options are
estimated in equilibrium, based on matches we observe in
cross-sectional data. To isolate the effect of more options
from the effect of productivity, the OOI is calculated without
using any information on wages or wage offers.
We then develop a method to estimate the OOI for each
worker in the labor market, which is computationally feasible even in large data sets. The OOI is a function of the joint
probability of every worker to be in every job. Our method
estimates this probability using the cross-sectional distribution of similar workers. We show that this problem can be
translated into a logistic regression framework. We then use
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the fast implementation of logistic regressions to estimate
the probabilities for every worker-job combination. From
those probabilities we can directly calculate the OOI for each
worker.
We use the OOI to analyze the impact of outside options
on inequality, starting with identification of which workers
have better outside options. Specifically, we estimate the
OOI for every worker in a representative sample of German
workers in 2014 using administrative linked employeremployee data. In order to validate our measure, we show
that the OOI predicts which workers are less affected by a
mass layoff: workers with better outside options recover
more quickly from a displacement. Because we do not use
wages to calculate the OOI, there is not a mechanical link
between the OOI and wages.
We use two sources of variation in options to estimate the
elasticity between the OOI and wages: 1) the introduction of
high-speed commuter rail stations (Heuermann and Schmieder 2018), and 2) a standard industry shift-share (“Bartik”)
instrument (Beaudry, Green, and Sand 2012). These instruments allow us to identify the elasticity between our OOI
and wages. The first instrument uses the introduction of
new commuter rail in small German towns. These stations,
located along existing routes, effectively increased the labor
market size for workers in small cities who happened to live
on routes between major German cities. Prior work showed
that the exact choice of town was largely driven by political considerations (Heuermann and Schmieder 2018). The
second instrument uses differences in exposure to industry
growth trends between local labor markets. We compare
workers who work in the same industry but have outside
options in different industries because they reside in different parts of the country. Both instruments yield a similar
semielasticity of roughly 0.17–0.32 between the OOI and
wages. Further, while the new train stations have the largest
impact on the options of highly skilled workers, the elasticity
does not vary across education groups.8
Combining this elasticity with the estimated distribution
of the OOI, we find that differences in outside options lead to
wage inequality. Differences in options lower compensation
for women (immigrants) by 6 (8) percentage points. This
explains roughly 30 percent (88 percent) of the overall gap in
Germany. We also find large effects that graduates of highersecondary education have greater outside options, which
increases their compensation by 7 percentage points (onefourth of the total return).9
Finally, the last part of the paper examines why certain
groups of workers have better options than others. We find
that heterogeneity in the ability or willingness to commute
can account for the full gender gap in outside options. We
also find that without their higher willingness to work at
more distant jobs, highly educated workers would actually
have fewer options. This is likely because their skills tend to
be more industry specific.
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Chapter 3
Monopsony and the Gender Wage Gap:
Experimental Evidence from the Gig Economy
(with Emily Oehlsen)
The third chapter also investigates the relationship
between imperfect competition in the labor market and
between-group wage inequality. When the labor market is
not perfectly competitive, firms are not price takers: in order
to recruit or retain more workers, they must offer higher
wages (see surveys in Ashenfelter, Farber, and Ransom
[2010]; Bhaskar, Manning, and To [2002]; Boal and Ransom
[1997]; Manning [2003]). Firms have an incentive to pay
higher wages to workers that are harder to recruit or retain
(workers that are more elastic to the firm), even if they are no
more productive than other workers.
The idea that imperfect competition in the labor market
could lead to a gender wage gap dates back to Joan Robinson’s 1933 book, in which she coined the term monopsony.
Women may earn less than men if they are, on average, less
willing to leave their employer in response to changes in firm
and market conditions (Card et al. 2016).10 This could be true
if women face smaller effective labor markets due to discrimination or commuting costs, or if they are less aggressive or
strategic about taking advantage of new opportunities (Babcock and Laschever 2009; Card, Cardoso, and Kline 2016).
In this chapter we use data from a series of randomized
experiments conducted at Uber to produce new evidence on
the elasticity of men and women’s labor supply, to both the
firm and the market. We use these elasticities to test whether
gender differences in firm-specific elasticities might contribute to a gender wage gap. The key advantage of the Uber
setting is that we are able to generate exogenous variation in
wages in a setting where it is clear what the alternative firm
is: Lyft.
The first part of the chapter outlines a theoretical model
that allows workers to adjust both how much they work (participation and hours) and for whom (firm substitution). The
model illustrates that when hours are flexible, the optimal
wage markdown depends on both the traditional firm substitution/recruitment elasticity and how responsive workers’
total hours are to changes in wages. The first elasticity measures the extent to which workers join or leave individual
firms in response to changes in relative wages. The second
measures the extent to which workers increase their overall
labor supply (at the expense of leisure) in response to wage
changes. We show that these two sets of elasticities are sufficient to calculate the optimal wage gap in a setting where
hours are flexible and in a setting where they are not.
We structured our experiments so that we were able to
estimate each of these elasticities. In these experiments
we offered random subsets of male and female drivers the
5

opportunity to have 25–39 percent higher wages for a week.
While some drivers had access to a competing ride-share
company (Lyft), others did not. Some of this variation comes
from the fact that Lyft temporarily left the Houston market.
We conducted one experiment while Lyft was out of this
market and another experiment after Lyft had returned. Some
of this variation comes from the fact that some Uber drivers
are, because of the age of their vehicle, ineligible to drive for
Lyft. Drivers in our experiments received offers by e-mail
and text message, as well as through the Uber application
itself. Because drivers were required to opt-in in order to
receive the wage increase, we are able to account for inattention as a possible confounder (Mas and Pallais 2018).
We first use data from the experiment conducted when Lyft
was out of the market to estimate Frisch elasticities for men
and women. While these elasticities serve as a baseline for
our analysis of firm substitution, they are also of independent
interest as they are a key component of most business cycle
models. And despite the large volume of research on male and
female labor supply, there is little quasi-experimental or experimental evidence that intensive or extensive margin Frisch
elasticities differ by gender (Killingsworth and Heckman
1986; McClelland and Mok 2012).11
We find that women have Frisch (market-level) elasticities
double those of men. In response to a 10 percent increase in
wages, female drivers work 7 percent more hours (ε = 0.7)
while male drivers work only 3 percent more hours (ε = 0.3).
The results are not driven by baseline differences in usual
hours worked or by differences in age. Our estimate of the
Frisch elasticity for men is similar to the estimates presented
in prior studies of taxi drivers (Farber 2005, 2015), but is
somewhat smaller than estimates in similar experiments
(Fehr and Goette 2007). We argue that this may be due, in
part, to the fact that it is typically difficult to observe parttime workers shifting hours across firms or platforms. The
extensive margin elasticities are modest, even among our
sample of marginally attached drivers. In response to a 10
percent increase in wages, women are at most 2 percentage
points more likely to drive (an elasticity of at most 0.18),
relative to a single percentage point for men (at most 0.09).12
To assess firm substitution, we then compare these
market-level Frisch elasticities to estimates from two similar
experiments where only a subset of the drivers cannot drive
for Lyft. Because the estimates from these experiments are
not precise, we also use data from a large Uber-run promotion we call the “individual driver bonus” to corroborate our
findings. Using both sets of data we find that drivers with
the opportunity to work for competing platforms are significantly more elastic. This likely reflects the fact that some of
their hours do not come from leisure but from Lyft. The gap
between the elasticities for drivers who could and could not
access Lyft is particularly pronounced for younger drivers,
who are likely more adept with the technologies Uber and
Lyft use.

2019 Dissertation Summaries

We use the elasticities for drivers who could and could
not drive for Lyft to compute implied firm substitution
elasticities for men and women. We find mean elasticities
between two and four. These estimates are in line with other
recent estimates of firm-specific elasticities, and suggest
optimal markdowns of between 20 and 33 percent.13 Our low
elasticities reflect the fact that, even in this setting, switching
between firms is not trivial.
In contrast to prior nonexperimental work, we do not
see any significant differences in firm-specific elasticities
between men and women (Hirsch, Schank, and Schnabel
2010; Ransom and Oaxaca 2010; Webber 2016). Our results
suggest that, even if gig economy firms wield monopsony
power, they do not have any incentive to pay women less.
This is true even in a world where hours are not flexible.
We view these estimates as a lower bound on the extent to
which monopsonistic firms outside of the gig economy might
be incentivized to pay women less than men. Our results suggest that women are no less strategic about taking advantage
of the opportunity to earn higher wages. However, in other
contexts, women may face higher commuting costs or constraints, which could result in lower firm-specific elasticities,
and thus lower wages. The results in Chapter 2 suggest that
the impact of these constraints can be sizable.
Notes
1. This is explicit in models where wages are determined by
bargaining between an individual and a firm or a union and
a firm (Acemoglu 2001; Farber 1987; Pissarides 2000). It is
implicit in models with posting; in these models, the wage a
firm chooses to post depends on the wages chosen by other
firms (Burdett and Mortensen 1998; Manning 2003).
2. Prior work has largely exploited industry- and region-level
variation (see, e.g., Beaudry, Green, and Sand 2012; Bidner
and Sand 2016; Fortin and Lemieux 2015; Hagedorn and
Manovskii 2013). Contemporaneous work by Jäger et al.
(2018) shows that there is no link between the value of nonemployment and wages.
3. Similar facts were presented in prior work by Myers and
Shultz (1951), Rees (1966), and Rees and Shultz (1970).
4. Our data cover the period 2008–2016. Most wage decentralization occurred in the 1990s.
5. Because our data are monthly, the base rate is low: roughly 1
percent of workers make a job-to-job transition each month.
6. In a separate set of robustness checks we show that we obtain
similar qualitative results when exploiting measures that are
based on changes in world demand for the products exported
by an individual’s former coworkers’ firms (Garin and Silverio
2018; Hummels et al. 2014).
7. The eight groups are 1) managers, 2) professionals, 3) technicians and associate professionals, 4) clerical support workers,
5) service and sales workers, 6) craft and related trade workers,
7) plant and machine operators, and 8) assembly workers.
8. The fact that highly educated workers’ options are most
affected is not surprising; tickets on these trains are fairly
expensive.
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9. The level that grants a certificate allowing college admission.
10. Similarly, search models predict that workers with lower
arrival rates of job offers earn less in equilibrium (Black 1995).
11. While a few studies have exploited temporary wage variation
in settings where workers can freely choose their hours, the
populations in these studies are predominantly male (Farber
2005, 2015; Fehr and Goette 2007; Oettinger 1999; Stafford
2015). Though most (more than 85 percent) of Uber drivers are
male, we structured our experiment to include roughly equal
numbers of male and female drivers and to include both partand full-time drivers (Hall and Krueger 2015).
12. These elasticities are significantly smaller than those typically
used to calibrate dynamic models; these models typically
assume an elasticity greater than 1 (Chetty et al. 2013; King
and Rebelo 1999).
13. Dube et al. (forthcoming) use a bunching estimator to derive
labor supply elasticities from administrative wage data and the
CPS. They report estimates of two and three (Table 3, Panel B)
for moderate values of optimization frictions.
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Azar, José, Ioana Marinescu, and Marshall I. Steinbaum. 2017.
Labor Market Concentration. Technical report. Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Babcock, Linda, and Sara Laschever. 2009. Women Don’t Ask:
Negotiation and the Gender Divide. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Barth, Erling, Alex Bryson, James C. Davis, and Richard Freeman.
2016. “It’s Where You Work: Increases in Earnings Dispersion
across Establishments and Individuals in the US.” Journal of
Labor Economics 34: S67–S97.
Beaudry, Paul, David A. Green, and Benjamin Sand. 2012. “Does
Industrial Composition Matter for Wages? A Test of Search and
Bargaining Theory.” Econometrica 80(3): 1063–1104.
Benmelech, Efraim, Nittai Bergman, and Hyunseob Kim. 2018.
Strong Employers and Weak Employees: How Does Employer
Concentration Affect Wages? Technical report. Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bhaskar, Venkataraman, Alan Manning, and Ted To. 2002. “Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor Markets.” Journal
of Economic Perspectives 16(2): 155–174.
Bidner, Chris, and Ben Sand. 2016. “Job Prospects and Pay Gaps:
Theory and Evidence on the Gender Gap from US Cities.”
Discussion Paper No. 16-14. Burnaby, British Columbia: Simon
Fraser University.
Black, Dan A. 1995. “Discrimination in an Equilibrium Search
Model.” Journal of Labor Economics 13(2): 309–334.
Boal, William M., and Michael R. Ransom. 1997. “Monopsony
in the Labor Market.” Journal of Economic Literature 35(1):
86–112.
Burdett, Kenneth, and Dale T. Mortensen. 1998. “Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment.” International
Economic Review 39(2): 257–273.

2019 Dissertation Summaries

Cahuc, Pierre, Fabien Postel-Vinay, and Jean-Marc Robin. 2006.
“Wage Bargaining with On-The-Job Search: Theory and Evidence.” Econometrica 74(2): 323–364.
Card, David, Ana Rute Cardoso, and Patrick Kline. 2016. “Bargaining, Sorting, and the Gender Wage Gap: Quantifying the Impact
of Firms on the Relative Pay of Women.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 131(2): 633–686.
Card, David, Ana Rute Cardoso, Jörg Heining, and Patrick Kline.
2016. “Firms and Labor Market Inequality: Evidence and Some
Theory.” Journal of Labor Economics 53(1): S13–S70.
Card, David, Jörg Heining, and Patrick Kline. 2013. “Workplace
Heterogeneity and the Rise of West German Wage Inequality.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(3): 967–1015.
Chetty, Raj, Adam Guren, Day Manoli, and Andrea Weber. 2013.
“Does Indivisible Labor Explain the Difference between Micro
and Macro Elasticities? A Meta-analysis of Extensive Margin
Elasticities.” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 27(1): 1–56.
Choo, Eugene, and Aloysius Siow. 2006. “Who Marries Whom and
Why.” Journal of Political Economy 114(1): 175–201.
Dahl, Christian M., Daniel Le Maire, and Jakob R. Munch. 2013.
“Wage Dispersion and Decentralization of Wage Bargaining.”
Journal of Labor Economics 3 (3): 501–533.
Dube, Arindrajit, Jeff Jacobs, Suresh Naidu, and Siddharth Suri.
Forthcoming. “Monopsony in Online Labor Markets.” American
Economic Review: Insights.
Dupuy, Arnaud and Alfred Galichon. 2014. “Personality Traits and
the Marriage Market,” Journal of Political Economy 122(6):
1271–1319.
Farber, Henry S. 1987. “The Analysis of Union Behavior.” In
Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol 2. Orley Ashenfelter and R.
Layard, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1039–1089.
———. 2005. “Is Tomorrow Another Day? The Labor Supply
of New York City Cabdrivers.” Journal of Political Economy
113(1): 46–82.
———. 2015. “Why You Can’t Find a Taxi in the Rain and Other
Labor Supply Lessons from Cab Drivers.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 130(4): 1975–2026.
Fehr, Ernst, and Lorenz Goette. 2007. “Do Workers Work More If
Wages Are High? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment.” American Economic Review 97(1): 298–317.
Flinn, Christopher, and Joseph Mullins. 2018. “Firms’ Choice of
Wage-Setting Protocols in the Presence of Minimum Wages.”
Working paper. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
Fortin, Nicole M., and Thomas Lemieux. 2015. “Changes in Wage
Inequality in Canada: An Inter-provincial Perspective.” Canadian
Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne D’économique 48(2):
682–713.
Garin, Andrew, and Filipe Silverio. 2018. “How Does Firm Performance Affect Wages? Evidence from Idiosyncratic Export
Shocks.” Harvard University Working Paper. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University.
Granovetter, Mark. 1973. “The Strength of Weak Ties.” American
Journal of Sociology 78(6): 1360–1380.
———. 1995. Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hagedorn, Marcus, and Iourii Manovskii. 2013. “Job Selection and
Wages over the Business Cycle.” American Economic Review
103(2): 771–803.
Hall, Jonathan V., and Alan B Krueger. 2015. “An Analysis of the
Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United States.”

7

Princeton University Industrial Relations Section Working Paper
No. 587. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.
Heuermann, Daniel F., and Johannes F. Schmieder. 2018. “The
Effect of Infrastructure on Worker Mobility: Evidence from
High-Speed Rail Expansion in Germany.” Journal of Economic
Geography 19(2): 335–372.
Hirsch, Boris, Thorsten Schank, and Claus Schnabel. 2010. “Differences in Labor Supply to Monopsonistic Firms and the Gender
Pay Gap: An Empirical Analysis Using Linked Employer-Employee Data from Germany.” Journal of Labor Economics 28(2):
291–330.
Hummels, David, Rasmus Jørgensen, Jakob Munch, and Chong
Xiang. 2014. “The Wage Effects of Offshoring: Evidence from
Danish Matched Worker-Firm Data.” American Economic Review
104(6): 1597–1629.
Ioannides, Yannis M., and Linda Datcher Loury. 2004. “Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects, and Inequality.” Journal
of Economic Literature 42(4): 1056–1093.
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